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ABSTRACT: This Article discusses the role of the Court of Justice in reviewing acts adopted under the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), seeking to determine to what extent the “exceptional-
ism” of the CFSP, its characterisation as a field of executive action largely shielded from judicial scruti-
ny, is an accurate assessment. The Court’s role is constrained in two ways. First, although the CFSP 
has been integrated into the overall legal structures of EU external relations by the Lisbon Treaty, it is 
still subject to “specific rules and procedures” (Art. 24, para. 1, TEU) and among these specific rules 
are limitations on the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice. Second, is the self-restraint of the Court itself 
when reviewing acts adopted within the framework of external policies in which the decision-making 
institutions have a wide discretion; this self-restraint is not specific to the CFSP but the CFSP is a clear 
case of broad policy discretion. Despite these constraints we are seeing a growing number of cases in 
which the Court is asked to assess the legality of CFSP acts. The Article will address three main ques-
tions: 1) What is the scope of the limitation to judicial review in the CFSP? 2) What is the scope of the 
Treaty-based exceptions to this limitation? 3) Does the degree and intensity of judicial scrutiny of 
CFSP acts demonstrate a particular judicial reticence with respect to CFSP?  
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I. Introduction 
The range of EU action under the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) is broad, 
including international agreements, different types of restrictive measures (counter-
terrorist, and different types of regime-sanctions), and civilian and military missions. 
These actions are implemented through administrative as well as operational action; 
thus for example, as we shall see, a CFSP civilian mission will entail many implementing 
decisions, including procurement decisions. Indeed, in the words of one Advocate Gen-
eral, “most of the acts envisaged in Chapter 2, Title V, of the TEU could be regarded as 
‘administrative’, if by that is meant that they regulate the conduct of the EU or national 
administrations”.1 This Article will discuss the role of the Court of Justice in reviewing 
acts adopted under and within the context of the CFSP, with the aim of exploring the 
degree to which administrative action in the CFSP is subject to judicial control. 
The CFSP represents perhaps the most quintessential “foreign policy” of the Union 
and given the traditionally restricted role for courts in national foreign policies, it might be 
surprising that the Union’s CFSP is subject to judicial control at all.2 However Art. 19 TEU 
requires the Court to “ensure that in the interpretation and application of the Treaties the 
law is observed”; this has been described by the Court itself as a “rule of general jurisdic-
tion”3 and represents a fundamental constitutional characteristic of the EU as an interna-
tional actor. It is certainly the case that in the external relations field in general the Court 
is restrained in reviewing the broad policy discretion of the EU institutions; it allows the 
institutions a wide policy space within which to act. The Court’s role is rather to ensure 
that the EU and its institutions operate within the limits of their powers, that the institu-
tional balance is maintained, that the Member States adhere to their commitments and – 
most importantly – that the rule of law and fundamental rights are upheld.4 
In the case of the CFSP, the position is complicated by the fact that, although the 
CFSP is integrated into the overall legal structures of EU external relations,5 it is still sub-
 
1 Opinion of AG Wahl delivered on 7 April 2016, case C-455/14 P, H v. Council and Commission, para. 59. 
2 On the role of the Court of Justice in relation to the CFSP, see among others R.A. WESSEL, Lex Imper-
fecta: Law and Integration in European Foreign and Security Policy, in European Papers, 2016, Vol. 1, No 
2, http://www.europeanpapers.eu/it/e-journal/lex-imperfecta-law-and-integration-european-foreign-and-
security-policy, p. 439 et seq.; C. HILLION, A Powerless Court? The European Court of Justice and the EU 
Common Foreign and Security Policy, in M. CREMONA, A. THIES (eds), The European Court of Justice and Ex-
ternal Relations Law - Constitutional Challenges, Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2014. 
3 Court of Justice, judgment of 24 June 2014, case C-658/11, European Parliament v. Council [GC], pa-
ra. 70. 
4 M. CREMONA, Structural Principles and their Role in EU External Relations Law, in Current Legal 
Problems, 2016, p. 35 et seq. 
5 See further M. CREMONA, The CFSP-CSDP in the Constitutional Architecture of the EU, in S. 
BLOCKMANS, P. KOUTRAKOS (eds), The EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy. A Research Handbook, 
Cheltenham/Northampton: Edward Elgar, 2018, forthcoming. 
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ject to “specific rules and procedures”,6 which both impact the administrative frame-
work and place limitations upon the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice. These deroga-
tions from the rule of general jurisdiction are in turn subject to exceptions designed to 
preserve the Court’s ability to ensure respect for the rule of law and the balance of 
competences. Amid this complicated arrangement of a general jurisdictional rule, limi-
tations of jurisdiction, and exceptions to the limitations, we are presented with the 
question: how exceptional is the CFSP within the overall framework of the EU’s legal or-
der and, more particularly, within the constitutional and administrative framework of 
EU external action? The CFSP’s place within the EU’s constitutional architecture has a 
number of different dimensions; here we will take the possibility of judicial review as 
our focus since this perhaps represents the hard core of EU administrative law and also 
since the limitations on the Court’s jurisdiction in the CFSP represent – it might be ar-
gued – one of the clearest instances of an accountability gap. Whether this is indeed the 
case is the question at the heart of the Article. We will break it down into three ques-
tions. First, what is the scope of the “specific rule” which limits judicial review of CFSP 
acts? On what criteria is an act characterised as “CFSP” and thereby subject to the limi-
tation (section III)? Second, what is the scope of the exception to the limitation? What 
types of act may be covered, and what types of jurisdiction (section IV)? Third, is the 
question of the degree or intensity of review where CFSP acts are subject to scrutiny, 
including examination of legal basis, compliance with procedural decision-making rules, 
as well as compliance with the rule of law and human rights (section V). Before turning 
to these questions, however, we should first briefly address the legal framework of the 
CFSP, and, in particular, the types of act that may be adopted within this policy field and 
the authors of those acts for the purposes of legal challenges, so as to provide the ad-
ministrative and legal context necessary for the discussion of judicial review (section II). 
II. The legal framework 
Since the Lisbon Treaty, the CFSP has formed part of the EU’s external action, governed 
by the overall mandate established in Art. 3, para. 5, TEU and the “General Provisions of 
the Union’s External Action” set out in Arts 21-23 TEU. This means that it shares the 
principles, objectives, strategic interests and general orientations of EU external action,7 
and is covered by the general principles of EU law, including respect for fundamental 
 
6 Art. 24, para. 1, TEU. 
7 See for example European Union, Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe – A Global 
Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign And Security Policy, approved by the European Council on 28 
June 2016, eeas.europa.eu, which brings together the CFSP and other external policies, including trade 
and development. 
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rights and the rule of law.8 The European Code of Good Administrative Behaviour ap-
plies to the administration in its conduct of the CFSP.9 In terms of decision-making and 
institutional structures, it is subject to “specific rules”, but in the absence of such specific 
rules the general rules apply. Thus, for example, the procedure for negotiating and con-
cluding treaties is governed by Art. 218 TFEU. This contains specific rules for the ap-
pointment of the EU negotiating team where the treaty “relates exclusively or principal-
ly” to the CFSP, and for the conclusion of treaties which relate exclusively to the CFSP 
(conclusion in such cases being by the Council without the consent or consultation of 
the European Parliament). But where Art. 218 TFEU does not establish a special rule, the 
general provision – for example, Art. 218, para. 10, TFEU requiring the European Parlia-
ment to be kept informed – will then apply.10  
As this example suggests, the institutional balance within the CFSP is different from 
that within other external policies, which generally reflect the standard institutional 
roles defined in Arts 14-17 TEU. The Commission as an institution does not have a right 
of initiative in CFSP decision-making, although one of its Vice-Presidents, the High Rep-
resentative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR), has the right to 
make proposals.11 Primary responsibility for implementation of the CFSP lies with the 
HR and the Member States, “using national and Union resources”.12 The HR is also re-
sponsible for external representation of the Union in matters relating to the CFSP, as 
opposed to the Commission which has general responsibility for ensuring the Union’s 
external representation.13  
The treaty provisions that deal with the CFSP allow for the adoption of only one 
type of legally binding act: the decision.14 When used in the CFSP context, the decision is 
not a legislative act and is not therefore adopted according to the ordinary or special 
legislative procedures, but rather by either the Council or the European Council.15 The 
exclusion of legislative acts carries a number of implications for administrative law: del-
egated acts and comitology are also excluded, and the principles of subsidiarity and leg-
 
8 Court of Justice, judgment of 14 June 2016, case C-263/14, European Parliament v. Council [GC], pa-
ra. 47: “As regards […] compliance with the principles of the rule of law and human rights, as well as re-
spect for human dignity, it must be stated that such compliance is required of all actions of the European 
Union, including those in the area of the CFSP, as is clear from the provisions, read together, set out in 
the first subparagraph of Article 21(1), Article 21(2)(b) and (3) TEU, and Article 23 TEU”. 
9 See for example Decision of the EU Ombudsman of 4 December 2014, case OI/15/2014/PMC. 
10 European Parliament v. Council [GC], cit. 
11 Art. 27, para. 1, TEU. Member States may also propose Common Security and Defence Policy mis-
sions: Art. 42, para. 4, TEU. 
12 Art. 26, para. 3, TEU. 
13 Arts 17, para. 1, and 27, para. 2, TEU. 
14 Art. 25 TEU. See further R.A. WESSEL, Resisting Legal Facts: Are CFSP Norms as Soft as They Seem?, 
in European Foreign Affairs Review, 2015, p. 123 et seq. 
15 The European Council acts unanimously; the Council generally acts unanimously, although some 
possibility for qualified majority voting exists: Arts 24, para. 1, and 31 TEU.  
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islative transparency do not apply.16 On the other hand, the general principle of trans-
parency is not excluded and the right of access to documents applies also to the CFSP. 
Regulation 1049/2001 governs public access to European Parliament, Council and 
Commission documents and there is no general exclusion for CFSP documents.17 Ac-
cess is to be refused where disclosure would undermine the protection of the public 
interest as regards (inter alia) public security, defence and military matters, and interna-
tional relations; while these grounds may of course apply to some CFSP documents 
they are not exclusively directed at the CFSP.18 The rules on access to documents are 
made applicable to the European External Action Service (EEAS) by means of the deci-
sion establishing the EEAS,19 implemented by a decision of the HR.20 
CFSP decisions may be used for a variety of purposes: they may define general guide-
lines and strategies;21 they may define operational action to be undertaken by the Union, 
including civilian and military missions,22 and positions of the Union on specific issues;23 
or they may conclude international agreements.24 In addition to these binding acts, the 
Council frequently adopts formal but non-binding “Conclusions”, which set out Union poli-
cy on specific issues. Additionally, the HR issues public statements taking a position on 
behalf of the Union. Although not binding in themselves, Council Conclusions will often 
prepare the way for the adoption of binding acts or will signal to the third country the 
conditions under which the Union will adopt (or revoke) a formal decision. Decisions of 
the type just mentioned, and implementing decisions, are binding acts and may be chal-
lenged on the basis of Art. 263 TFEU, as long as the Court has jurisdiction in the specific 
 
16 Art. 24, para. 1, TEU. The Protocol on the Application of the Principles of Subsidiarity and Propor-
tionality applies to legislative acts. On legislative transparency see Art. 15, para. 2, TFEU. 
17 Regulation (EC) 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2001 regard-
ing public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents. The preamble, at para. 7, 
makes it clear that the right of access also applies to documents related to the CFSP. 
18 Art. 4, para. 1, of Regulation 1049/2001. See also Art. 9 on the treatment of sensitive documents. 
One of the seminal cases on the application of these exceptions, proportionality and partial access in fact 
concerned the CFSP: Court of Justice, judgment of 6 December 2001, case C-353/99 P, Council of the Eu-
ropean Union v. Heidi Hautala. See generally P. LEINO, The principle of transparency in EU External Rela-
tions Law – Does diplomatic secrecy stand a chance of surviving the age of twitter?, in M. CREMONA (ed), 
Structural Principles in EU External Relations Law, Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2018, forthcoming. 
19 Council Decision 2010/427/EU of 26 July 2010 establishing the organisation and functioning of the 
European External Action Service, Art. 11. 
20 High Representative Decision 2011/C 243/08 of 19 July 2011 implements access to documents for 
the EEAS. The Decision provides that the right of access to EEAS documents will operate “according to the 
principles, conditions and limits” laid down in Regulation 1049/2001. 
21 Arts 25, let. a), and 26, para. 1, TEU. Note that decisions may be used for this purpose but not all 
strategic positions are adopted by binding decision; Council conclusions and public statements of the HR 
are frequently used. 
22 Arts 25, para. b), let. i), and 28 TEU. 
23 Arts 25, para. b), let. ii), and 29 TEU. 
24 Art. 37 TEU and Art. 218, para. 5, TFEU. 
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case (as discussed in the following sections). Their challenge is subject to the usual stand-
ing requirements. Decisions in individual cases adopted by (for example) a Head of Mis-
sion may be challenged if they produce legal effects, although, as we shall see, it will be 
necessary to identify the institution to which the act can be attributed. 
Implementation is of course important from the perspective of administrative law 
because it is in the process of implementation that the individual is likely to come into 
contact with the exercise of Union power. Within the CFSP, as already mentioned, im-
plementation is primarily the responsibility of the HR, assisted by the EEAS,25 in some 
cases by a Special Representative,26 and Member States. A decision adopted by the 
Council under CFSP to impose restrictive measures against a third country may there-
fore be implemented directly by the Member States (a visa ban or arms embargo), or by 
Council Regulation adopted under Art. 215 TFEU (economic or financial restrictions). A 
decision launching an operational action will establish its “objectives, scope, the means 
to be made available to the Union, if necessary [its] duration, and the condition for [its] 
implementation”.27 Implementation may involve EEAS staff based in Brussels or in Un-
ion delegations, staff seconded by Member States, or independent contractors, and fi-
nancial commitments which are managed by the Commission. Implementing decisions 
may be adopted by the Council.28  
In the case of restrictive measures, amendments to the originating CFSP decision 
(for example, to amend the list of targeted individuals) is done by way of an amending 
decision adopted, like the original, on the basis of Art. 29 TEU. The subsequent regula-
tion adopted under Art. 215 TFEU will normally contain provision for equivalent 
amendments to the Annexes by implementing acts of the Commission or Council on 
the basis of Art. 291, para. 2, TFEU.29 In National Iranian Oil Company, the Court of Jus-
tice rejected an argument that amendments to a regulation imposing restrictive 
measures should be adopted under the primary legal basis (Art. 215 TFEU) rather than 
Art. 291, para. 2, TFEU.30 In the first place it took the view that the adoption of imple-
menting acts was not precluded by Art. 215 TFEU and that the difference in procedure 
between the two provisions was not a barrier since the joint proposal by the High Rep-
resentative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the Commission required by Art. 
215 TFEU is not a procedural guarantee, and a listed individual was able to have re-
 
25 Art. 27, para. 3, TEU. 
26 Art. 33 TEU. 
27 Art. 28, para. 1, TEU. 
28 Art. 291, para. 2, TFEU, referring to Arts 24 and 26 TEU. This is an exception to the general rule 
whereby implementing decisions are adopted by the Commission. 
29 For an account of the decision-making procedures for restrictive measures see L. LEPPÄVIRTA, Pro-
cedural Rights in the Context of Restrictive Measures: Does the Adversarial Principle Survive the Necessity 
of Secrecy?, in European Papers, 2017, Vol. 2, No. 2, www.europeanpapers.eu, p. 649 et seq.  
30 Court of Justice, judgment of 1 March 2016, case C-440/14 P, National Iranian Oil Company v. 
Council [GC]. 
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course to the CJEU whichever of the two provisions was used as a legal basis.31 In the 
second place it held that the conditions for granting implementing powers to the Coun-
cil under Art. 291, para. 2, TFEU were satisfied. The basic Regulation conferred imple-
menting powers to amend the Annexes on the Commission in most cases (e.g. the lists 
of goods or technologies covered) but reserved to the Council the ability to amend the 
Annexes insofar as they listed natural or legal persons. The sensitive nature of individu-
al listings and their impact on fundamental rights justified their adoption by the Council. 
Interestingly for our subject here, the Court of Justice also relied on the fact that the 
original listing decision is taken by the Council under the CFSP and that it is important 
that the CFSP decision (and any amendments) are reflected immediately in the imple-
menting Regulation; the Court referred to the need “to ensure the consistency of the 
procedures” and held that coordination between the amendment of the CFSP decision 
and the Regulation is necessary to ensure speed: normally the two acts will be adopted 
on the same day.32 Here then we see the specific decision-making procedures of the 
CFSP impacting the allocation of implementing powers under the Regulation as a result 
of the close links between the two. 
Under the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), a decision may launch a ci-
vilian or a military mission (the “tasks” defined in Art. 43 TEU). These missions are im-
plemented using Member States resources (civilian and military capabilities) and are 
subject to the political control and strategic direction of the Political and Security Com-
mittee and the coordination of the HR acting under the responsibility of the Council. 
Thus, even where Member State resources are used, the chain of command is headed 
by the HR, acting under the Council’s authority. The Political and Security Committee 
may also be authorised by the Council to take decisions. 
These structures – which contain multiple actors – have implications for judicial re-
view: to whom is a decision attributed and against whom can a legal challenge be 
brought? Given the different actors involved, and the presence of seconded staff, the 
answer may not always be obvious. The case of H illustrates the issues well. A national 
official seconded to the EU’s Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUPM) sought to 
challenge a decision taken by the Head of Mission; the action was originally brought be-
fore the General Court against the Council, Commission and the EUPM. In an Order re-
fusing an application for the interim suspension of the decision, the President of the 
General Court held that, as a mission, the EUPM was a “simple activity” of the Union, 
and did not have the status of a body, office or agency within the meaning of Art. 263 
TFEU; it thus did not have the capacity to defend legal proceedings and the case should 
have been brought against the Council and Commission.33 As the staff member was se-
 
31 Ibid., paras 33-46. 
32 Ibid., paras 47-58. 
33 General Court, order of 10 July 2014, case T-271/10 R, H v. Council and Commission, paras 18-21. 
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conded by a Member State, there was also the possibility of bringing an action in the 
relevant national court, something which the applicant had, in fact, also done. The Gen-
eral Court, taking the view that it lacked jurisdiction on the ground that the case did not 
fall within the Court’s limited CFSP jurisdiction, pointed to the provision of the Council’s 
decision establishing the EUPM, according to which:  
“The State or EU institution having seconded a staff member shall be responsible for an-
swering any claims linked to the secondment, from or concerning the staff member. The 
State or EU institution in question shall be responsible for bringing any action against 
the seconded person”.34  
Under this decision, operational control is transferred by the seconding State to the 
Civilian Operation Commander and command and control is to be exercised by the 
Head of Mission; however, “[a]ll seconded staff shall remain under the full command of 
the national authorities of the seconding State or EU institution concerned”.35 The Gen-
eral Court’s conclusion was that “whilst the contested decisions were taken by the Head 
of Mission, they can in principle be attributed to the Italian authorities” and that 
“[a]ccordingly the legality of those measures must be reviewed by the Italian court”.36 
This enabled the Court to find that, although (in its view) judicial review before the Gen-
eral Court was excluded under Art. 275 TFEU, there would be no denial of the right to 
an effective remedy. We will return later to the question of complementarity of reme-
dies before national and EU Courts; for now it should be noted that the Court of Justice, 
on appeal in the H case, held that the EU Courts did in fact have jurisdiction since the 
decision should not be qualified as a CFSP act.37 In referring the case back to the Gen-
eral Court for decision, the Court of Justice took the view that the case was nevertheless 
inadmissible against the Commission, since it did not involve a contractual or budgetary 
issue and “the Commission is not involved in the chain of command of the EUPM in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina”.38 The Council, in contrast, is at the apex of that chain of 
command: the Head of Mission who actually adopted the decision acts under the au-
thority of the Civilian Operation Commander who acts under the authority of the Politi-
cal and Security Committee (PSC) and HR; the PSC exercises political control and strate-
gic direction of the EUPM under the responsibility of the Council; the contested decision 
was therefore imputable to the Council.39 On the other hand where a decision taken by 
 
34 Art. 8, para. 2, of Council Decision 2009/906/CFSP of 8 December 2009 on the EUPM in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (BiH).  
35 Ibid., Art. 5, para. 4. 
36 H v. Council and Commission, cit., paras 50 and 52. 
37 Court of Justice, judgment of 19 July 2016, case C-455/14 P, H v. Council and Commission [GC]. See 
further infra, section III. 
38 Ibid. para. 65. 
39 Ibid., paras 66-67. 
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a Head of Mission concerns matters for which financial responsibility lies with the 
Commission – such as a procurement process – he or she will be acting under delegat-
ed authority from the Commission. In that case it is to the Commission that the act will 
be attributed.40  
This is also the approach taken by the EU Ombudsman when investigating cases of 
alleged maladministration in relation to CFSP missions, although in his decision on an 
own-initiative inquiry in 2013 the Ombudsman commented that “the situation was 
characterised by significant uncertainties as to which EU institution or body would be 
competent to remedy possible instances of maladministration in this type of situation 
(i.e., the Council, the Commission or the HR/EEAS)”.41 His conclusion – which has since 
been applied in subsequent cases – was that: 
“the Ombudsman will address himself, as regards future complaints and inquiries con-
cerning the activities of EU missions, (i) to the Commission in so far as issues relating to 
budget implementation in civilian missions are concerned and (ii) to the High Repre-
sentative/EEAS in so far as all other allegations of maladministration in relation to CSDP 
missions are concerned”.42 
The same reasoning applies to Union delegations, which according to the General 
Court in Elti are not a “body, office or agency” within the meaning of Art. 263 TFEU.43 In 
order to bring annulment proceedings with respect to an act adopted by a Head of Dele-
gation, therefore, it is necessary to decide to which EU institution the act is to be attribut-
ed. Before the Treaty of Lisbon, representation in third countries was carried out by 
Commission delegations and acts of delegations could be imputed to the Commission for 
the purposes of legal responsibility.44 Under the Lisbon Treaty, the position is more com-
 
40 Court of Justice, judgment of 12 November 2015, case C-439/13 P, Elitaliana SpA v. Eulex Kosovo, 
paras 56-67. Note that procurement by EU institutions and bodies falls under different (though not dis-
similar) rules from procurement by Member State authorities; EU procurement, including in the context 
of external action, is governed by the Financial Regulation, i.e. by Arts 190 and 191 of Regulation (EU, Eur-
atom) 966/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012 on the financial rules 
applicable to the general budget of the Union and repealing Council Regulation 1605/2002, and is subject 
to the European Court of Auditors. See further, especially on the difficulty of bringing non-contractual 
liability claims against the EU institutions in procurement cases, R. CARANTA, The Liability of EU Institutions 
for Breach of Procurement Rules, in European Procurement and Public Private Partnership Law Review, 
2013, p. 238 et seq. 
41 European Ombudsman Decision of 30 August 2013 closing his own-initiative inquiry 
OI/12/2010/(BEH)MMN concerning the Council of the European Union, the European Commission and the 
High Representative/European External Action Service, para. 28. 
42 Ibid., conclusions. 
43 General Court, order of 4 June 2012, case T-395/11, Elti d.o.o v. Delegation of the European Union 
to Montenegro, para. 73. 
44 General Court, order of 30 June 2011, case T-264/09, Technoprocess Srl v. Commission and Dele-
gation of the European Union to Morocco, para. 70. 
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plicated. Union delegations, staffed by members of the EEAS and the Commission, are 
under the authority of the HR; the Head of Delegation is accountable to the HR.45 Despite 
the fact that the Head of Delegation may conclude contracts and be a party to legal pro-
ceedings in the third country of accreditation, the delegation is not an independent entity 
from the point of view of liability before the EU Courts and is treated as a division of the 
EEAS, that is as “an integral part of its hierarchical and functional structure”.46 Despite this 
hierarchical relationship with the HR and Council, where the decision taken in the delega-
tion concerns financial or budget issues – such as procurement for which the Commission 
is responsible under the financial regulation – the Commission will be the proper ad-
dressee of a legal challenge before the EU Courts.47 As the General Court put it in Elti, “the 
legal status of the Union Delegations is characterised by a two-fold organic and functional 
dependence with respect to the EEAS and the Commission”.48 
How does the European External Action Service (EEAS) fit into this picture? The EEAS is 
not an institution of the Union;49 according to Art. 27, para. 3, TEU, the EEAS exists to as-
sist the HR. It is a “functionally autonomous body of the European Union, separate from 
the General Secretariat of the Council and from the Commission with the legal capacity 
necessary to perform its tasks and attain its objectives”.50 It therefore qualifies as a “body” 
within the meaning of Art. 263 TFEU and those of its acts which have legal effects may in 
principle be challenged before the EU Courts. However, Gatti makes a convincing argu-
ment that we need to distinguish between the different aspects of EEAS action.51 In terms 
of its own administration, the EEAS is indeed autonomous and it should therefore take 
responsibility for its acts before the EU Courts. This would include staff disputes under 
Art. 270 TFEU, decisions on access to documents and the handling of confidential infor-
mation, and the administration of its budget under the Financial Regulation. However, as 
Gatti rightly argues,52 the EEAS does not have autonomous powers when it comes to the 
implementation of EU policies; here, it assists the HR (acting under Council authority) and 
Commission. As we have seen in the case of EU delegations (which are themselves part of 
the EEAS) and EU missions, the precise nature of a measure needs to be assessed so as to 
impute an act to either the Council or the Commission. 
 
45 Art. 221 TFEU; Art. 5 of Council Decision 2010/427/EU, cit.. 
46 Elti d.o.o v. Delegation of the European Union to Montenegro, cit., para. 35. 
47 Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) 1605/2002 of 25 June 2002 on the financial regulation applicable 
to the general budget of the European Communities, as amended by Regulation 1081/2010 of the Euro-
pean Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 amending [the Financial Regulation] as regards 
the European External Action Service. 
48 Elti d.o.o v. Delegation of the European Union to Montenegro, cit., para. 46. 
49 EU institutions are listed in Art. 13, para. 1, TEU. 
50 Art. 1, para. 2, of Council Decision 2010/427/EU, cit. 
51 M. GATTI, Diplomats at the Bar: The European External Action Service Before EU Courts, in Europe-
an Law Reiew, 2014, p. 664 et seq. 
52 Ibid. 
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In the case of CFSP missions and Union delegations, therefore, acts will need to be 
attributed to the appropriate institution for the purposes of legal challenge before the 
EU Courts. Measures may be imputed to the EEAS where they concern its own admin-
istration; however where it is implementing the CFSP (or other external policies) then it 
is not acting under independent powers and a legal challenge should be addressed to 
the Council or Commission. As expressed by Advocate General Jääskinen in Elitaliana, 
“[t]he present case illustrates […] the extent to which the European Union’s external ac-
tion is fragmented, lacks transparency and makes it difficult to determine the legal lia-
bility of its various actors”.53 This complexity gives rise to the risk of error on the part of 
an applicant who may well wrongly attribute the act, resulting in the action being de-
clared inadmissible.54 
In the foregoing discussion we have seen the CFSP operating within the general 
framework of legal accountability; the rules applied in attributing an act for the purpos-
es of judicial review are not specific to the CFSP although as we have seen they may well 
be complex to apply given the multiplicity of actors involved in implementing CFSP, their 
sometimes ambiguous legal status and hierarchical relationships. The identification of 
the act and the question of attribution is of course only an initial step. If the act is found 
to “relate to” the CFSP, the CJEU’s jurisdiction will be severely limited by the “specific 
rule” contained in Art. 275 TFEU. It is to this that we now turn. 
III. Limiting the Court’s jurisdiction 
According to the first paragraph of Art. 275 TFEU, “[t]he Court of Justice of the European 
Union shall not have jurisdiction with respect to the provisions relating to the common 
foreign and security policy nor with respect to acts adopted on the basis of those provi-
sions”. In the Mauritius case the Court held that this provision creates “a derogation 
from the rule of the general jurisdiction which Article 19 TEU confers on the Court to 
ensure that in the interpretation and application of the Treaties the law is observed, 
and [it] must, therefore, be interpreted narrowly”.55 The reference to Art. 19 TEU is both 
logical and significant; it signals that the CFSP is part of the Union’s legal order,56 albeit 
subject to some special rules concerning procedure and institutional powers, and the 
 
53 Opinion of AG Jääskinen delivered on 21 May 2015, case C-439/13 P, Elitaliana SpA v. Eulex Kosovo, 
para. 19. 
54 In Elitaliana the Court, in finding that the CFSP mission Eulex Kosovo did not have legal capacity 
and the action in question was to be attributed to the Commission, also rejected an argument that since 
“the complex legal situation of the contract in question made it difficult to identify the party to whom the 
measures at issue were attributable” the applicant’s error was excusable (Elitaliana SpA v. Eulex Kosovo, 
cit., para. 71).  
55 European Parliament v. Council [GC], case C-658/11, cit., para. 70. 
56 See for example, R.A. WESSEL, The Dynamics of the European Union Legal Order: An Increasingly 
Coherent Framework of Action and Interpretation, in European Constitutional Law Review, 2009, p. 117. 
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general jurisdiction of the Court of Justice is an important part of that legal order. As a 
policy field, the CFSP is integrated into the Union’s general principles, such as the rule of 
law, which pertain to the exercise of administrative discretion.57  
Indeed, in addition to its reliance on Art. 19 TEU, the Court has also based its inter-
pretation of Art. 275 TFEU on the fundamental principles of the rule of law and effective 
judicial protection, in particular where an individual challenge to the validity of CFSP 
acts is concerned. The rule of law is found among the Union’s values in Art. 2 TEU and 
its application to the CFSP is made clear by Arts 21, para. 1, and 23 TEU.58 The principle 
of effective judicial protection is contained in Art. 47 of the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union. As the Court of Justice pointed out in a recent judgment, 
“the very existence of effective judicial review designed to ensure compliance with pro-
visions of EU law is of the essence of the rule of law”,59 and 
“[w]hile, admittedly, Article 47 of the Charter cannot confer jurisdiction on the Court 
where the Treaties exclude it, the principle of effective judicial protection nonetheless 
implies that the exclusion of the Court’s jurisdiction in the field of the CFSP should be in-
terpreted strictly”.60  
As a sign of this strict interpretation, despite the potential ambiguity in the refer-
ence to “these provisions” in Art. 24, para. 1, TEU, and in the phrase “provisions relating 
to” the CFSP in Art. 275 TFEU, they have been interpreted as including only the provi-
sions of the CFSP chapter of the TEU (Chapter 2 of Title V, TEU) and acts based on 
them.61 Other treaty provisions which may be connected to CFSP action, including pro-
cedural provisions, are not covered by the exclusion of jurisdiction. This allows the 
Court – while granting the CFSP full scope as a policy field62 – to ensure that “CFSP ex-
ceptionalism” with respect to its own jurisdiction does not creep beyond its proper 
bounds. The Mauritius and Tanzania cases illustrate this well. 
 
57 R. GOSALBO BONO, Some reflections on the CFSP legal order, in Common Market Law Review, 2006, 
p. 347; P. EECKHOUT, EU External Relations Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011, p. 498; C. HILLION, A 
Powerless Court? The European Court of Justice and the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy, cit.; P. 
VAN ELSUWEGE, Upholding the Rule of Law in the Common Foreign and Security Policy : H v Council, in 
Common Market Law Review, 2017, p. 841. 
58 See also European Parliament v. Council [GC], case C-263/14, cit., para. 47. 
59 Court of Justice, judgment of 28 March 2017, case C-72/15, PJSC Rosneft Oil Company [GC], para. 73. 
60 Ibid., para. 74. 
61 See Opinion of AG Wathelet delivered on 31 May 2016, case C-72/15, PJSC Rosneft Oil Company, 
paras 42-46, rejecting an argument that the phrase in Art. 275 TFEU could be interpreted more broadly. 
62 Art. 40 TEU makes clear that the CFSP has equal status to other EU policies and is not a residual 
competence, a significant difference from the pre-Lisbon position expressed in Art. 47 TEU and Court of 
Justice, judgment of 20 May 2008, case C-91/05, Commission v. Council [GC]. 
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Both cases concerned international agreements concluded by the Council under a 
CFSP legal basis, which was in both cases accepted by the Court.63 The procedure for the 
conclusion of CFSP agreements is governed by the procedural rules of Art. 218 TFEU, a 
provision which “is of general application and is therefore intended to apply, in principle, 
to all international agreements negotiated and concluded by the European Union in all 
fields of its activity, including the CFSP”.64 The Court’s jurisdiction over these procedural 
treaty-making rules is not affected by the derogation applicable to the substantive CFSP 
legal basis.65 Thus it had jurisdiction to rule on the Council’s compliance with Art. 218, pa-
ra. 10, requiring the Parliament to be kept informed of the negotiation of all agreements, 
including – it was held – CFSP agreements. In this way, the Court preserves the power to 
adjudicate not only over the proper choice of substantive legal basis (Art. 40 TEU), but also 
to ensure respect for the powers of the institutions (institutional balance).66 
Art. 275 TFEU also limits the Court’s jurisdiction over “acts adopted on the basis of” 
CFSP provisions. This covers acts adopted with a CFSP legal basis, such as Arts 28, or 29, 
TEU, but does not extend to acts simply because they were adopted in the context of a 
CFSP measure or mission. In Elitaliana, the Court held that its jurisdiction was not ex-
cluded since the act in question concerned the procurement of helicopters (for the CFSP 
mission Eulex Kosovo) and was covered by the EU’s procurement rules and the general 
financial regulation.67 Here the Court is ensuring that the CFSP derogation does not 
compromise its jurisdiction over the EU’s general rules of administration: 
“the measures at issue, whose annulment was sought on the basis of an infringement of 
the rules of EU public procurement law, related to the award of a public contract which 
gave rise to expenditure to be charged to the European Union budget. Accordingly, the 
contract at issue is subject to the provisions of the Financial Regulation. […] [T]he scope 
of the limitation, by way of derogation, on the Court’s jurisdiction […] cannot be consid-
ered to be so extensive as to exclude the Court’s jurisdiction to interpret and apply the 
provisions of the Financial Regulation with regard to public procurement”.68 
 
63 European Parliament v. Council [GC], case C-658/11, cit.; European Parliament v. Council [GC], case 
C-263/14, cit. The agreements were concluded with the third country partners in the context of the EU’s 
naval anti-piracy mission off the coast of Somalia (known as “Operation Atlanta”) and concerned the con-
ditions under which those suspected of piracy could be transferred to the third country for detention and 
trial. See S.R. SÁNCHEZ-TABERNERO, The choice of legal basis and the principle of consistency in the proce-
dure for conclusion of international agreements in CFSP contexts: Parliament v. Council (Pirate-Transfer 
Agreement with Tanzania), in Common Market Law Review, 2017, p. 899 et seq. 
64 European Parliament v. Council [GC], case C-658/11, cit., para. 72. 
65 Ibid., para. 73. 
66 P. VAN ELSUWEGE, Securing the Institutional Balance in the Procedure for Concluding International 
Agreements: European Parliament v Council (Pirate Transfer Agreement with Mauritius), in Common 
Market Law Review, 2015, p. 1379 et seq. 
67 Elitaliana SpA v Eulex Kosovo, cit. 
68 Ibid., paras 48-49. 
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In H we again see the Court ensuring its general administrative jurisdiction, in this 
case relating to staff management, despite a CFSP context.69 The Commission sought in 
this case to make a distinction between different types of CFSP act and to limit the Art. 
275 TFEU derogation to “CFSP acts which are an expression of sovereign foreign policy 
(‘actes de gouvernement’), as opposed to acts merely implementing that policy”.70 The 
Commission also argued that the CFSP derogation only applies to cases where an act 
was alleged to breach a CFSP Treaty provision, but not where the alleged breach was of 
a non-CFSP provision; this latter argument was based on Elitaliana where, as was seen, 
the alleged breach was of the financial regulation and procurement rules. AG Wahl did 
not find the attempt to distinguish between the types of CFSP act as suggested by the 
Commission and the appellant convincing. On the one hand, he pointed out that since 
legislative acts are excluded from the CFSP much of its action is in fact executive, opera-
tional or implementing in nature:  
“most of the acts envisaged in Chapter 2, Title V, of the TEU could be regarded as ‘admin-
istrative’, if by that is meant that they regulate the conduct of the EU or national admin-
istrations. … By its very nature, the CFSP appears to be an operational policy: one by 
means of which the Union pursues its (broadly defined) objectives through a set of 
(broadly defined) actions, mainly of an executive and political nature”.71 
If administrative acts were excluded from the CFSP derogation then – the Advocate 
General argued – its scope would be reduced to an extent not reconcilable with the 
wording of Art. 24, para. 1, TEU and Art. 275 TFEU. The Advocate General also argued 
that the distinction between “actes de gouvernement” and acts of implementation was 
both unclear and lacking any basis in the Treaties. The CFSP Chapter of the TEU con-
tains a number of provisions which may form the legal basis for acts of implementation 
and “those acts may often be of great political significance and sensitivity”.72  
The Court in H did not pursue this line either. Instead it argued that the CFSP con-
text in which an act is adopted “does not necessarily lead to the jurisdiction of the EU 
judicature being excluded”.73 Its finding that it had jurisdiction was based on two 
somewhat different arguments. The first started from the principle of equality between 
EU and national seconded staff. Art. 270 TFEU grants the Court jurisdiction in relation to 
EU staff seconded to the CFSP mission; the Court referred to equality as a value of the 
Union alongside the rule of law,74 and found that although staff seconded by the EU 
 
69 H v. Council and Commission [GC], cit. 
70 Opinion of AG Wahl delivered on 7 April 2016, case C-455/14 P, H v. Council and Commission, para. 
33; see also H v. Council and Commission [GC], cit., para. 32. 
71 Ibid., para. 59. 
72 Ibid., para. 62. 
73 H v. Council and Commission [GC], cit., para. 43.  
74 Ibid., para. 41. 
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and those seconded by Member States were not subject to the same rules in all re-
spects, they were “subject to the same rules so far as concerns the performance of their 
duties ‘at theatre level’”, and the decision in question related to the allocation of such 
duties.75 Second, the Court held that, although decisions on the allocation of staff have 
an “operational aspect” falling within the CFSP, “they also constitute, by their very es-
sence, acts of staff management”.76 The conclusion brings together both these argu-
ments: the limitation on the Court’s jurisdiction 
“cannot be considered to be so extensive as to exclude the jurisdiction of the EU judica-
ture to review acts of staff management relating to staff members seconded by the 
Member States the purpose of which is to meet the needs of that mission at theatre lev-
el, when the EU judicature has, in any event, jurisdiction to review such acts where they 
concern staff members seconded by the EU institutions”.77  
These cases, in which the Court has determined the scope of the derogation, are 
based on two types of argument. The first is based on general principles, including the 
rule of law, of which effective judicial review is an inherent part, but also including other 
principles such as equality. This is important in establishing that the CFSP is not exclud-
ed from the operation of these principles which form part of the EU acquis. The Court 
links its own jurisdiction to the protection of those principles. The second is based on 
distinguishing between CFSP acts and those which are adopted “in the context of” the 
CFSP. Although the Court is (ostensibly) not seeking to differentiate between types of 
CFSP acts, the H case is striking in this respect since the Court seems to accept that the 
decision under challenge could have a CFSP character – “an operational aspect falling 
within the CFSP” – while also constituting an act of staff management. And although the 
Court in H did not directly engage with the Commission’s argument that it should take 
into account the higher norm which the act is alleged to violate, the fact that it was the 
staff management character of the decision which prevailed in this case was presuma-
bly linked to the fact that the alleged illegality related not to the management of the 
CFSP operation but to the operation of the Staff Regulations.  
To the question of identifying the institution to which a CFSP act should be imputed, 
discussed in the previous section, we must therefore add the need to determine 
whether the act is in fact a CFSP act or whether it is adopted “in the context” of a CFSP 
policy, but essentially pertains to rules within the Court’s jurisdiction. Where the act un-
der challenge is adopted directly on a CFSP legal basis, then both authorship and the 
application of the derogation is clear and the task will be to decide whether one of the 
exceptions to the derogation – discussed in the next section – applies. It is where the act 
 
75 Ibid., para. 50. 
76 Ibid., para. 54. 
77 Ibid., para. 55.  
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is a decision of a person in a hierarchical relation to the Council, HR, EEAS or Commis-
sion (such as a Head of Mission) that both the attribution of the act and its characterisa-
tion as a CFSP act becomes more difficult. 
IV. The exception: judicial review of CFSP acts 
The scope of the limitation of the Court’s jurisdiction is of course not the whole story. 
That limitation, or derogation, is itself subject to exceptions. Under the second para-
graph of Art. 275 TFEU, judicial review of the validity of CFSP acts is possible in two cas-
es. First, to “monitor compliance” with Art. 40 TFEU, and second in the case of “proceed-
ings, brought in accordance with the conditions laid down in the fourth paragraph of 
Article 263 [TFEU] reviewing the legality of decisions providing for restrictive measures 
against natural or legal persons adopted by the Council” under CFSP powers. Art. 24, 
para. 1, TEU refers more generally to “jurisdiction […] to review the legality of certain 
decisions as provided for by the second paragraph of Article 275 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union”. 
Art. 40 TEU essentially requires the Court to ensure that the appropriate legal basis 
is used and is thus a constitutional rather than an administrative control. For that rea-
son, we will make only brief reference to it here in order to show that the Court has not 
attempted to constrain the limits to its jurisdiction over the CFSP by limiting the scope 
of the CFSP as a policy field. Instead it has insisted on a strict reading of the derogation 
itself, as we saw in section III, combined with a flexible reading of the exceptions to the 
derogation, as we will see in this section. 
Unlike its predecessor,78 Art. 40 TEU does not establish a preference for using non-
CFSP powers where possible. In fact it is striking that in its post-Lisbon case law the 
Court of Justice has applied its standard approach to legal basis, based on identifying 
the predominant aim or purpose of the measure, together with an analysis of content. 
Art. 40 TEU is cited in order to justify the Court’s jurisdiction, but does not appear to in-
fluence the reasoning on legal basis one way or the other.79 In contrast to the Court’s 
insistence that the limitations on its own jurisdiction should be interpreted strictly, it ac-
cepts the limits on the role of the European Parliament in decision-making that apply 
where a CFSP legal basis is chosen as simply the result of the political choices made by 
the drafters of the Treaty. According to the Court of Justice, although Parliamentary par-
ticipation in law-making is an expression of the principle of democratic representation, 
the Parliament’s exclusion from CFSP decision-making should not influence the choice 
of legal basis, but is “the result of the choice made by the framers of the Treaty of Lis-
 
78 Art. 47 TEU. 
79 See for example European Parliament v. Council [GC], case C-658/11, cit.; European Parliament v. 
Council [GC], case C-263/14, cit. 
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bon conferring a more limited role on the Parliament with regard to the Union’s action 
under the CFSP”.80  
These cases on legal basis have all involved the European Parliament, a privileged 
applicant under Art. 263 TFEU where its own prerogatives are concerned. In most cases 
where the validity of a legal act is in issue, an individual is unlikely to have an interest in 
pleading legal basis,81 but the case of the CFSP is different as a result of the Court’s lim-
ited jurisdiction. Art. 40 TEU can also be pleaded by a natural or legal person seeking 
the annulment of a CFSP act on the ground of an incorrect legal basis, either via a direct 
action under Art. 263 TFEU or via a preliminary ruling. In Rosneft, the Court pointed out 
that, in referring to “monitoring compliance” with Art. 40 TEU, Art. 275 TFEU does not 
specify any particular type of action; the Court therefore has jurisdiction to rule on 
compliance with Art. 40 TEU on a request for a preliminary ruling.82 It will nonetheless 
prove difficult for an individual to successfully challenge the exercise of executive dis-
cretion under CFSP powers using Art. 40 TEU.83 
The second exception is more directly relevant to administrative law. It will be re-
called that the Court has jurisdiction in “proceedings, brought in accordance with the 
conditions laid down in the fourth paragraph of Article 263 [TFEU] reviewing the legality 
of decisions providing for restrictive measures against natural or legal persons adopted 
by the Council on the basis of Chapter 2 of Title V of the Treaty on European Union [the 
CFSP chapter]”. This provision, introduced by the Lisbon Treaty, reflects the Kadi case 
law on the need for effective judicial protection where restrictive measures are adopted 
against individuals. Measures adopted under Art. 215 TFEU are challengeable under the 
normal rules of standing set out in Art. 263, para. 4, TFEU, which require direct and indi-
vidual concern. In practice, standing is not difficult to establish in the case of restrictive 
measures since the individuals concerned will be identified by name in Annexes:  
“any inclusion in a list of persons or entities subject to restrictive measures […] allows 
that person or entity access to the Courts of the European Union, in that it is similar, in 
 
80 Court of Justice, judgment of 19 July 2012, case C-130/10, European Parliament v. Council [GC], pa-
ra. 82. As a result, the decision to choose a CFSP legal basis is ultimately in the hands of the Council and, 
given the breadth of the policy field, the application of the standard legal basis test makes it difficult in 
practice to challenge that choice. For further discussion on establishing the boundary between the CFSP 
and other external action, see M. CREMONA, The CFSP-CSDP in the Constitutional Architecture of the EU, in 
S. BLOCKMANS, P. KOUTRAKOS (eds), The EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy, cit. 
81 Exceptions would include cases where a possible legal basis contains limitations on the type of ac-
tion that may be taken, such as excluding harmonisation. See e.g. Court of Justice, judgment of 10 De-
cember 2002, case C-491/01, R v. Secretary of State for Health, ex parte British American Tobacco and 
Imperial Tobacco. 
82 PJSC Rosneft Oil Company [GC], cit., paras 62-63. 
83 See further discussion in section V below. 
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that respect, to an individual decision, in accordance with the fourth paragraph of Article 
263 TFEU”.84  
A regulation adopted under Art. 215 TFEU must be preceded by a CFSP decision, and 
the CFSP decision may contain measures – a visa ban for example – which will be imple-
mented by the Member States directly rather than by the EU via Art. 215 TFEU. The excep-
tion in Art. 275 TFEU is then important to allow the individual to challenge the underlying 
CFSP decision, as well as the Art. 215 TFEU regulation which gives (some of) it effect. 
The listing of natural and legal persons takes place in the context of two distinct 
types of restrictive measure. First, counter-terrorism measures, where the primary tar-
gets are the individuals or entities concerned (whether derived from UN listings or au-
tonomous EU listings) and second, measures directed at a third country (sometimes 
called “regime sanctions”) in which natural and legal persons may be targeted as mem-
bers of, or closely connected to, the regime. From the point of view of the Court’s juris-
diction, the exception in Art. 275 TFEU, and standing, the two types of restrictive meas-
ure are indistinguishable; from the point of view of intensity of review they differ in 
practice, as we shall see in section V. Here we will focus on restrictive measures directed 
at a third country which include sanctions directed at listed individuals.85 
The exception in Art. 275 TFEU only gives the Court jurisdiction to decide on the va-
lidity of the decision insofar as it actually refers to the listed individual bringing the ac-
tion; it does not have jurisdiction in relation to any parts of the decision that are not 
targeted at specific individuals, for example those prohibiting the sale of specific prod-
ucts or the provision of specific services to the third country concerned. These are not 
“restrictive measures against natural or legal persons” within the meaning of Art. 275 
TFEU.86 Here we see a distinction in the reviewability of different types of restrictive 
measure which may be contained in the same decision. In principle this is not a ques-
tion of the standing of a specific individual (direct and individual concern) but rather a 
determination of whether the particular restrictive measure is of individual or general 
application; however in practice the criteria are substantially the same.  
A more open question concerns whether “restrictive measures against natural or 
legal persons”, limits the exception to sanctions of the type envisaged by Art. 215 TFEU 
which must be preceded by a CFSP decision, or might be interpreted more broadly to 
cover other types of CFSP act prejudicial to an individual. In the H case, the Commission 
suggested that the more general wording of Art. 24, para. 1, TEU could include “any act 
 
84 National Iranian Oil Company v. Council [GC], cit., para. 44. On standing, see L. LEPPÄVIRTA, Proce-
dural Rights in the Context of Restrictive Measures, cit., p. 649 et seq. 
85 For further discussion of counter-terrorist sanctions, see L. LEPPÄVIRTA, Procedural Rights in the 
Context of Restrictive Measures, cit., p. 649 et seq. 
86 General Court, judgment of 25 April 2012, case T-509/10, Kala Naft v. Council, paras 36-38, af-
firmed by the Court of Justice in judgment of 28 November 2013, case C 348/12 P, Council v. Kala Naft, 
para. 99. See also PJSC Rosneft Oil Company [GC], cit., paras 95-99. 
“Effective Judicial Review is of the Essence of the Rule of Law” 689 
adopted by an EU institution against a person which produces legal effects in relation to 
him that potentially infringe his fundamental rights” and that this interpretation was in 
line with the respect for fundamental rights required by the Treaties.87 AG Wahl was not 
convinced by this argument.88 The Court did not rule on the point but it seems unlikely 
that it would broaden the exception to the derogation by giving such an extensive in-
terpretation to “restrictive measures”; instead it has preferred to narrow the scope of 
the derogation itself. As we have seen, the Court did cite fundamental rights (Art. 47 of 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, the right to an effective 
remedy) in support of its jurisdiction in the case. 
A second question relates to the forms of action covered by the exception. At first 
sight this might seem clear: unlike the exception in respect of compliance with Art. 40 
TEU, the exception in respect of restrictive measures against individuals makes an ex-
plicit reference to direct actions for annulment under Art. 263 TFEU. Art. 24 TEU, on the 
other hand, merely refers to “reviewing the legality” of certain CFSP decisions. The pos-
sibility of applying the exception where the validity of an act is challenged via prelimi-
nary ruling was raised by Rosneft. The Court, following AG Wathelet89 and differing 
from the view of AG Kokott in Opinion 2/13,90 held that, where the validity of a CFSP act 
is concerned, preliminary references are also covered by the exception. Its reasoning is 
revealing. The Court starts by referring to the two procedures for contesting the validity 
of EU acts (direct actions and preliminary rulings) as complementary and as ensuring “a 
complete system of legal remedies and procedures designed to ensure judicial review 
of the legality of European Union acts”.91 The language is of course familiar and the 
Court cites the classic cases on standing and judicial review, Les Verts, Unión de 
Pequeños Agricultores and Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami.92 It then argues that, while CFSP de-
cisions on restrictive measures will need to be implemented by Member States, national 
courts do not have the jurisdiction to declare Union acts invalid; the preliminary ruling 
procedure enables the issue of validity to be referred to the Court of Justice.93 This is 
 
87 H v. Council and Commission [GC], cit., para. 33.  
88 Opinion of AG Wahl, H v. Council and Commission, cit., paras 73-80. 
89 Opinion of AG Wathelet, PJSC Rosneft Oil Company, cit. 
90 View of AG Kokott delivered on 13 June 2014, opinion procedure 2/13.  
91 PJSC Rosneft Oil Company [GC], cit., para. 66. 
92 Court of Justice: judgment of 23 April 1986, case 294/83 Les Verts v. Parliament; judgment of 25 Ju-
ly 2002, case C-50/00 P, Unión de Pequeños Agricultores v. Council; judgment of 3 October 2013, case C-
583/11 P, Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami et al. v. Parliament and Council. 
93 As our concern here is with judicial review, I will not enter into the question as to whether ques-
tions of interpretation of CFSP acts could also be referred to the Court via preliminary ruling. The Advo-
cate General in Rosneft concluded that questions of interpretation would be covered: Opinion of AG 
Wathelet, PJSC Rosneft Oil Company, cit., paras 73-75; the references in the Court’s judgment in the same 
case to the purpose of Art. 267 TFEU and the need to preserve the unity of Union law might suggest that 
the Court would also be open to this extension. In other cases the Court has been able to side-step the 
issue by interpreting the parallel provisions in the regulation and then referring to the CFSP decision and 
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significant in indicating that the Court is prepared to assess the scope of the exception 
in the context of the overall Treaty framework, and, in particular, of its role in ensuring 
the legality of Union acts: “That essential characteristic of the system for judicial protec-
tion in the European Union extends to the review of the legality of decisions that pre-
scribe the adoption of restrictive measures against natural or legal persons within the 
framework of the CFSP”.94 
It had been suggested that were it not possible to apply the judicial review excep-
tion to the preliminary ruling procedure, national courts would be required, by the prin-
ciple of effective judicial protection, to decide upon that validity themselves.95 The Court 
explicitly rejects this argument, and its reasoning – which also refers to effective judicial 
protection – treats the Art. 275 TFEU exception as being as much concerned with its 
own judicial monopoly on controlling the validity of EU law and the unity of the Union 
legal order as with individual rights.96 
What of the wording of Art. 275 TFEU itself, containing as it does a reference to Art. 
263 TFEU? According to the Court, “proceedings brought in accordance with the condi-
tions laid down in the fourth paragraph of Article 263” refers not to the type of proce-
dure “but rather the type of decisions whose legality may be reviewed by the Court, 
within any procedure that has as its aim such a review of legality”.97 It seems also that 
the reference to “conditions” does not refer to standing, since the Art. 263 standing 
rules do not apply in the case of preliminary rulings; however, as already mentioned, 
the act must be directed at an individual and not of general application, so this particu-
lar consequence of Rosneft is not of great practical importance. 
Therefore, while the CFSP decisions (or provisions of such decisions) which may be 
reviewed are limited to restrictive measures directed against natural or legal persons, the 
procedures under which such review may take place are aligned to non-CFSP review.  
V. Grounds for and intensity of review 
In the scope of the Court’s jurisdiction as regards the CFSP, we can see the two dimen-
sions to its role with which we started this Article: to ensure that the EU and its institu-
tions operate within the limits of their powers and the institutional balance is main-
 
the regulation together; see for example Court of Justice, judgment of 14 March 2017, case 158/14 A, B, C, 
D v. Minister van Buitenlandse Zaken [GC], para. 97.  
94 PJSC Rosneft Oil Company [GC], cit., para. 69. P. VAN ELSUWEGE, Judicial Review of the EU’s Common 
Foreign and Security Policy: Lessons from the Rosneft case, in Verfassungsblog, 6 April 2017, verfas-
sungsblog.de. 
95 View of AG Kokott delivered on 13 June 2014, opinion 2/13, paras 95-103. For the contrary posi-
tion, see Opinion of AG Wahl delivered on 7 April 2016, case C-455/14 P, H v. Council and Commission, 
para. 33; see also H v. Council and Commission [GC], cit., paras 101-103. 
96 PJSC Rosneft Oil Company [GC], cit., paras 77-80. 
97 Ibid., para. 70. 
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tained; and to uphold the rule of law and fundamental rights. These two dimensions are 
also unsurprisingly evident when we turn to the question of substantive review. 
We have already seen that the Court is concerned with ensuring respect for the 
powers of the institutions under the relevant decision-making procedures. In the Mauri-
tius and Tanzania cases, the Court stressed the importance of complying with the obli-
gation in Art. 218, para. 10, TFEU of informing the Parliament of the negotiation and 
conclusion of CFSP agreements, thereby ensuring it can play its role in democratic scru-
tiny.98 In its assessment of compliance with Art. 40 TEU in Rosneft, the Court assessed 
whether the CFSP decision disturbed the decision-making balance foreseen in the Trea-
ties between the CFSP and Art. 215 TFEU, holding that in the case of restrictive 
measures, and given the broad discretion of the Council in the field of the CFSP, it was 
reasonable for the Council in its CFSP decision to specify, with a high degree of preci-
sion, the types of measures to be adopted and the identities of targeted persons, 
thereby circumscribing the scope of the regulation.99  
This emphasis on the Council’s discretion has also influenced the Court’s willingness 
to assess the reasons for imposing restrictive measures and more importantly, for list-
ing an individual. Despite the importance of the Kadi case law, insisting on the right to 
effective judicial protection (which was the impetus for the exceptional jurisdiction over 
restrictive measures granted by Art. 275 TFEU), with its concomitant stress on the duty 
to state reasons, the Court of Justice’s approach to reviewing restrictive measures tar-
geting third countries, and companies and individuals associated with third country re-
gimes, has been restrained. The difference is not a difference in the legal rules applica-
ble – the rights of defence and the right to effective judicial protection apply in both 
types of case100 – but reflects the different nature of counter-terrorism and regime 
sanctions. Counter-terrorism sanctions are directed at “persons, groups and entities in-
volved in terrorist acts” and this criterion is defined in terms of specific types of activi-
ty.101 The listing of an individual therefore implies specific conduct and the case law has 
attempted to determine the degree of specificity of evidence required to substantiate 
the listing as well as the right of the individual to be aware of the factual evidence 
against him or her, based on the rights of defence and the right to effective judicial pro-
tection.102 The CJEU are to ensure that the decision has been taken on “a sufficiently sol-
 
98 Although limited, this role includes scrutiny of appropriate use of legal basis and contributing to 
the overall coherence of Union policy. See further T. RAUNIO, Control and scrutiny: parliaments as agents 
of administrative law, in C. HARLOW, P. LEINO, G. DELLA CANANEA (eds), Reseach Handbook on EU Administra-
tive Law, Cheltenham/Northampton: Edward Elgar, 2017. 
99 PJSC Rosneft Oil Company [GC], cit., paras 86-90. 
100 Court of Justice, judgment of 21 April 2015, case C-630/13 P, Issam Anbouba v. Council [GC], para. 46. 
101 See for example Council Common Position 2001/931/CFSP of 27 December 2001 on the applica-
tion of specific measures to combat terrorism, Art. 1. 
102 See further L. LEPPÄVIRTA, Procedural Rights in the Context of Restrictive Measures, cit., p. 649 et 
seq. 
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id factual basis” and this “entails a verification of the allegations factored in the sum-
mary of reasons underpinning that decision”.103  
Individual listings in the case of third country sanctions, on the other hand, are 
more various and may be based on broad grounds. They may target those who are 
members of a regime, or who are associated with a regime. The Council in each case 
has the discretion to determine the reason for the listing and the demonstration of a 
link to the regime does not require personal conduct: it may simply require being a 
member of a category of persons, inferred from a family relationship with a regime 
leader, from holding a position or simply from prominence in the country concerned.104 
The Court is concerned primarily with ensuring that there is consistency between the 
aim of the measure as stated and the reason given for the listing of the individual. In a 
recent example, in the context of the sanctions against Iran adopted in the context of 
nuclear proliferation, the Court upheld the inclusion of companies on the basis that 
they “supported the government of Iran”, even if their activities had no direct or indirect 
connection with nuclear proliferation, rejecting an argument that the criteria were so 
broad as to grant the Council unconditional powers, thereby contravening the rule of 
law.105 The Court relied heavily on the Council’s objectives as stated in the regulation, in 
the light of an amendment to the regulation which broadened its scope:  
“the objective of the amendment of the criterion at issue had been to expand the desig-
nation criterion, in order to target the relevant person or entity’s own activity which, 
even if it has no actual direct or indirect connection with nuclear proliferation, is none-
theless capable of encouraging it”.106  
The Court emphasised the “broad discretion” granted to the legislature “in areas 
which involve political, economic and social choices” and “complex assessments”. The 
legality of a measure in such cases is affected “only if the measure is manifestly inap-
propriate having regard to the objective which the competent institution is seeking to 
pursue”.107 In such cases, the Court is concerned with checking that the reason given for 
designating an individual or company matches the stated aims of the measure; it will 
not question the Council’s discretion in adopting such broadly-targeted measures. In 
 
103 Court of Justice, judgment of 18 July 2013, joined cases C-584/10 P, C-593/10 P and C-595/10 P, 
Commission and Council v. Yassin Abdullah Kadi [GC], para. 119. 
104 See for example Court of Justice, judgment of 21 April 2015, case C-630/13 P, Issam Anbouba v. 
Council [GC], para. 52, in which the Court of Justice held that “the General Court was entitled to hold that 
Mr Anbouba’s position in Syrian economic life, his position as the president of SAPCO, his important func-
tions within both Cham Holding and the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Homs and his relations 
with a member of the family of President Bashar Al-Assad constituted a set of indicia sufficiently specific, 
precise and consistent to establish that he provided economic support for the Syrian regime”. 
105 National Iranian Oil Company v. Council [GC], cit. 
106 Ibid., para. 80. 
107 Ibid., para. 77. 
“Effective Judicial Review is of the Essence of the Rule of Law” 693 
some recent examples the aim of the measures is defined in such a way as to arguably 
take it outside the scope of third country sanctions altogether, but the Court has not 
raised any difficulty.108  
These cases are focused on due process within the EU’s own decision-making proce-
dures. However, under some circumstances the standards of due process in third coun-
tries may also be relevant. AG Sharpston has recently emphasised the importance of due 
process, including by the “competent authorities” of third countries for the purposes of 
Common Position 2001/931 in the context of the EU’s counter-terrorism sanctions.109 She 
argued that while the Council may be justified in presuming that the decisions of the 
competent authorities of a Member State will have been taken in compliance with fun-
damental rights, the same was not necessarily the case for third countries, and a case by 
case assessment should be made. It is worth citing the opinion at some length: 
“When the Council relies on decisions of competent authorities of Member States acting 
within the scope of EU law, it is a given that those authorities are under a duty to respect 
the fundamental rights applicable in the European Union. Thus, the standards of protec-
tion and the level of protection — as a matter of EU law— are well established and subject 
to the Court’s review. When relying on their decisions, the Council will normally be justified 
in presuming that those decisions have been taken in compliance with applicable funda-
mental rights, in particular, the rights of defence and effective judicial protection”.110  
“The situation is different where the Council decides to rely on a decision of a competent 
authority of a third State. Those authorities do not act within same constraints as the 
Member States in terms of fundamental rights protection, even if their legal protection 
of fundamental rights might be at least equivalent to that guaranteed under EU law. … 
It is for the Council to verify whether the level of fundamental rights protection is at least 
equivalent to that under EU law and whether there is evidence pointing to the possibility 
 
108 Recent restrictive measures concerning Egypt, Tunisia and Ukraine have targeted individuals on 
the ground that they were guilty of, or under investigation for, misappropriation of State funds. These 
measures are not targeted at an existing third country regime; on the contrary they are adopted after a 
change of government, with the support of the new regime. In Al Matri the grounds for including the ap-
plicant’s name in the CFSP decision did not mention misappropriation of state funds but instead referred 
to actions which were under investigation ‘as part of money laundering operations’. On the ground that 
money laundering was not necessarily the same as misappropriation of public funds, the Court annulled 
the particular decision as far as it concerned the applicant; however it did not question the appropriate-
ness of the Council using restrictive measures to target those responsible, or under investigation, for 
misappropriation of State funds: General Court, judgment of 28 May 2013, case T-200/11, Al Matri v. 
Council. See also Court of Justice, judgment of 5 March 2015, case C-220/14 P, Ezz and others v. Council.  
109 Opinion of AG Sharpston delivered on 22 September 2016, case C-599/14 P, Council v. LTTE (Tamil 
Tigers) and Opinion of AG Sharpston delivered on 22 September 2016, case C-79/15 P Council v. Hamas. 
110 Opinion of AG Sharpston, Council v. LTTE (Tamil Tigers), cit., para. 62. 
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that the decision at issue may not have been adopted in compliance with the relevant 
and applicable standard of protection”.111 
The existence of a duty on the part of the Union’s decision-maker to assess and 
take account of the fundamental rights compliance of a third country and more general-
ly of the fundamental rights implications in third countries when engaging in external 
action appears to be emerging more clearly as a principle of EU external relations law. 
The General Court in the Front Polisario case recognised the broad discretion of the in-
stitutions in conducting EU foreign policy. As a result, its review of the Council’s decision 
to conclude an international agreement was concerned with ensuring that the Council 
had examined and taken account of all relevant facts. Among those facts were the im-
plications of the agreement for fundamental rights in the territory affected by the 
agreement.112 As expressed by AG Wathelet in the same case, the institutions have an 
“obligation under EU law to examine the general human rights situation in the other 
party to the international agreement, and more specifically to study the impact which 
that agreement could have on human rights”.113 The Court of Justice did not rule on this 
issue, but – as important – it emphasised the need to interpret the EU’s international 
agreement so as to comply with the right to self-determination and other peremptory 
norms of international law.114 This particular case concerned trade policy rather than 
the CFSP, but there is no reason in principle why the same reasoning should not apply 
to the CFSP. Indeed, in the different context of choice of legal basis, the Court has re-
ferred to the obligation on the Union to comply with fundamental rights in the context 
of all external action, including the CFSP.115 Although the issue was choice of legal basis, 
the Court was referring to substantive provisions in the agreement in question de-
signed to ensure substantive human rights compliance by a third country; it refused to 
see these provisions as a reason for excluding the CFSP legal basis. So far, then, the 
need to take account of the human rights implications of external action (including the 
CFSP) has presented itself in terms of a procedural obligation: the need to examine all 
 
111 Ibid., paras 65-67. In its judgment the Court of Justice agreed (upholding the judgment of the 
General Court on this point) that “the Council must, before acting on the basis of a decision of an authori-
ty of a third State, verify whether that decision was adopted in accordance with the rights of the defence 
and the right to effective judicial protection”, and that it must “provide, in the statements of reasons relat-
ing to those decisions, the particulars from which it may be concluded that it has ascertained that those 
rights were respected”. Court of Justice, judgment of 26 July 2017, case C-599/14 P, Council v. LTTE (Tamil 
Tigers) [GC], paras 22-38.  
112 General Court, judgment of 10 December 2015, case T-512/12, Front Polisario v. Council, paras 
223-228. 
113 Opinion of AG Wathelet delivered on 13 September 2016, case C-104/16P, Council v. Front Polisa-
rio, para. 257. 
114 Court of Justice, judgment of 21 December 2016, case C-104/16 P, Council v. Front Polisario [GC], 
paras 118-125. 
115 European Parliament v. Council [GC], case C-263/14, cit. 
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relevant facts. The Court of Justice in the Tanzania case and Front Polisario opens up 
the issue of substantive compliance and there is no doubt that the obligation to comply 
with fundamental rights applies to the EU institutions when acting within the frame of 
the CFSP.116 As pointed out by De Schutter, the principle is clear; it is its operationalisa-
tion which proves more difficult.117  
VI. Conclusion 
This Article has sought to explore the application of judicial review to challenge CFSP 
acts in the context of administrative law. We have seen that in fact the CFSP, in common 
with other external policy fields, operates through administrative and executive action. 
The CFSP is part of the EU legal order, albeit subject to some special rules and proce-
dures which affect the institutional balance in decision-making. This means that general 
EU administrative law and administrative principles apply to the CFSP, including the 
right to an effective legal remedy. Nevertheless the CFSP’s specific rules and procedures 
do affect the application of administrative law, especially legal accountability through 
judicial review, and there is no doubt that this is a field in which executive discretion is 
broadly defined. The absence of legislative acts and the very restricted powers of the 
Parliament when it comes to the negotiation and conclusion of international agree-
ments in the CFSP underline the importance of executive action. Especially in the case 
of implementing acts the complex institutional structures and variety of actors in CFSP 
policy-making, including not only the Council but also the HR, the EEAS, EU Delegations, 
Heads of EU civil and military missions, and staff seconded by Member States but acting 
under EU operational control, can make it difficult to identify the author of an act and 
impute responsibility to the right institution or body for the purposes of judicial review. 
Against this background, we considered the scope of the derogation from the Court 
of Justice’s normal powers of judicial review. The Court has not sought to limit the use 
of the CFSP as a policy field, for example by regarding it as a residuary power to be used 
only when other external powers are insufficient. On the other hand, it has emphasized 
 
116 Court of Justice, judgment of 14 June 2016, case C-263/14, European Parliament v. Council [GC], 
para. 47. In Court of Justice, opinion 1/15 of 26 July 2017, the Court ruled for the first time that a draft 
agreement could not be concluded in its current form as it contained provisions that were incompatible 
with the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. The Court held that the prior opinion 
procedure under Art. 218, para. 11, TFEU, must examine “all questions that are liable to give rise to 
doubts as to the substantive or formal validity of the agreement with regard to the Treaties” and that this 
includes “the compatibility of an international agreement with the first subparagraph of Article 6(1) TEU 
and, consequently, with the guarantees enshrined in the Charter, since the Charter has the same legal 
status as the Treaties.” Opinion 1/15, cit., para. 70. 
117 O. DE SCHUTTER, The Implementation of the Charter of Fundamental Rights in the EU institutional 
framework, Study conducted for the Committee on Constitutional Affairs of the European Parliament, 
November 2016, p. 63-66, available at www.europarl.europa.eu.  
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the generalized nature of its own mandate to ensure that the law is observed (Art. 19 
TEU), the resulting need to interpret exceptions to its jurisdiction strictly, and the ap-
plicability of the rule of law and fundamental rights to CFSP action. In a series of cases it 
has limited the scope of the derogation and shown flexibility in interpreting the excep-
tions to that derogation. Thus many administrative acts adopted in the context of the 
CFSP, even in the operational context of a CFSP mission, will not be excluded from judi-
cial review since they are not “CFSP acts” in the strict sense, adopted on a CFSP legal ba-
sis, but are instead part of the EU’s general administrative machinery, including in par-
ticular financial and personnel procedures. The jurisdiction to assess the validity of re-
strictive measures against natural and legal persons adopted under CFSP powers has 
been held to apply not only to direct actions for annulment (referred to expressly in the 
Treaties) but also to the preliminary ruling procedure. Standing is not in practice a prob-
lem in these cases. As a result the difficulties faced by individuals in seeking to chal-
lenge the validity of executive and administrative acts in the CFSP do not flow so much 
from Treaty-based (constitutional) obstacles or derogations but rather from the familiar 
administrative law problems of attribution of responsibility in complex administrations 
and the difficulty of challenging the exercise of wide discretionary powers.  
There is little evidence that the Court is particularly sensitive to the CFSP when it 
comes to the degree and intensity of judicial review. There is no real difference in its 
approach to the two primary acts involved in adopting restrictive measures, the CFSP 
decision and the regulation adopted on the basis of Art. 215 TFEU. The difference lies 
more in the type of restrictive measure or sanction, and in particular between counter-
terrorism sanctions and third country sanctions, albeit in both cases the Court is con-
cerned with procedural safeguards for listed individuals. In the case of third country 
sanctions the Council has very wide discretion in framing the aim and scope of the 
measures and the Court is concerned to ensure that the reasons provided for listing an 
individual or legal person (such as familial, economic or political status) relate to those 
stated aims. In cases where the lack of such a link has led to the annulment of a meas-
ure in respect of a specific individual, the act may be amended to broaden its aim and 
the individual re-listed.  
The focus of this Article has been judicial review, since that seemed to encapsulate 
the “exceptional” status of the CFSP. As a final point, however, we should remind our-
selves that other types of administrative accountability also apply to CFSP, in particular 
the role of the EU Ombudsman in ensuring administrative good practice. The Om-
budsman has indeed opened more than one procedure involving the CFSP, including an 
own-initiative inquiry on the EEAS handling of allegations of serious irregularities involv-
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ing the EU Rule of Law Mission (Eulex) in Kosovo,118 and a decision on the way in which 
Eulex Kosovo implemented restructuring and organised internal competitions.119  
Our conclusion must be that there is a rich administrative practice in the CFSP and 
that it is by no means an excluded zone either for administrative law or for the Court of 
Justice. The Court is far from reticent in ensuring that it has jurisdiction where the validi-
ty of EU acts is in question, and where procedural rights (both individual and institu-
tional) are at stake. The Court’s reticence with respect to policy substance and the exer-
cise of discretion is by no means special to the CFSP but reflects its approach to exter-
nal policy in general.120 The decisions of the Ombudsman suggest that she has an im-
portant role to play in assisting the CFSP administration, including the EEAS, in develop-
ing good administrative practice. 
 
118 EU Ombudsman Decision of 4 December 2014, case OI/15/2014/PMC. 
119 EU Ombudsman Decision of 23 February 2016, case OI/2/2015/MG. 
120 M. CREMONA, Structural Principles and their Role, cit., p. 35. 
 
